The majority judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered by Justice Okon Abang today, as reported, appears vulnerable to substantial legal criticism if tested against established Supreme Court jurisprudence on political party affairs, the Electoral Act, and the Constitution of the African Democratic Congress (ADC). By contrast, the dissenting opinion of Justice Abba Mohammed appears more closely aligned with settled principles of Nigerian electoral law delivered by the Supreme Court.

The principal criticism of the majority decision is that it expands judicial intervention into what is essentially an internal party dispute. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that courts lack jurisdiction over the domestic affairs of political parties except where the Constitution or the Electoral Act expressly confers jurisdiction. In cases such as Emeka v. INEC, PDP v. Sylva, and numerous subsequent decisions, the apex court has consistently maintained that the management of party structures, appointment of committees, leadership disputes and congresses are internal matters beyond judicial review unless they directly involve statutory electoral rights.

The majority’s reliance on the recent Supreme Court decision concerning the leadership dispute in the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) is, with respect, distinguishable. That decision concerned compliance with constitutional requirements affecting the office of National Secretary and the legal consequences flowing from constitutional provisions governing political parties. It did not create a general licence for courts to supervise every disagreement within a political party. To interpret it as opening the door to judicial control over congresses and committee appointments stretches the ratio decidendi beyond its proper limits.

Secondly, Section 223 of the Constitution merely requires political parties to operate democratically. It does not prescribe which organ of a political party must constitute congress committees or administer internal elections. Those matters are left to the party’s constitution. Therefore, a complaint that a caretaker committee, rather than elected officers, constituted congress committees does not automatically become a constitutional question merely because Section 223 is cited.

Thirdly, the Electoral Act equally provides no jurisdiction for courts to determine which internal organ of a political party should conduct congresses. The Act primarily empowers INEC to monitor congresses after receiving statutory notice. It does not authorise courts to micro-manage the internal administrative machinery through which political parties organise those congresses.

Furthermore, the ADC Constitution itself just like all other party constitutions in Nigeria including that of the APC recognises the supremacy of the National Convention and the National Executive Committee in administering the affairs of the party. Where a valid National Convention or the competent national organ like the NEC/NWC establishes a Caretaker Committee of the NWC pending reorganisation of party structures, that committee ordinarily exercises all powers delegated to it by the appointing authority. Unless the ADC Constitution expressly prohibits a caretaker committee from constituting congress committees (which is not the case), the court ought not to imply such a restriction.

Another difficulty with the majority judgment is its assumption that the tenure of the State Executive Committees automatically insulated them from national reorganisation. Political party constitutions generally confer supervisory authority on national organs such as the National Convention, NEC and NWC over state structures. Whether that supervisory power was properly exercised is fundamentally an intra-party issue that the Supreme Court has held is not justiciable.

A further concern relates to the apparent suggestion that the judgment may imperil the candidature of persons who subsequently emerged from the ADC’s primary elections for the 2027 general elections. With respect, such a conclusion does not necessarily follow from either the pleadings or the reliefs reportedly sought in the action. The suit before the Federal High Court challenged the legality of committees constituted to conduct state congresses for the election of party executives and the continued tenure of the elected State Executive Committees. It was not, from the available facts, an action challenging the validity of primary elections conducted for the nomination of candidates for elective offices under the Electoral Act.

This distinction is not merely semantic but fundamental. Party congresses are internal organisational processes designed to elect party officers, whereas primary elections are statutory electoral processes conducted for the nomination of candidates to public office under the Electoral Act. They are governed by different legal regimes and serve entirely different constitutional purposes. Consequently, unless the Court of Appeal expressly pronounced on the validity of the party’s primary elections – a matter that would itself invite scrutiny as to whether the court travelled beyond the issues submitted for determination – its decision should not automatically be construed as nullifying the nomination of ADC candidates for the 2027 general elections.

Indeed, it is a settled principle of adjudication that courts are bound by the issues submitted by the parties and ought not to grant reliefs beyond the claims before them. If the dispute before the Federal High Court related solely to the conduct of congresses for the election of party executives, any interpretation extending the judgment to invalidate subsequent primary elections for the nomination of candidates would raise substantial legal questions. Such an extension would conflate two distinct legal processes governed by different provisions of the law and would be susceptible to appellate review.

Justice Abba Mohammed’s dissent is therefore more consistent with settled Supreme Court authority. His conclusion that the dispute was non-justiciable reflects the long-established principle that courts should not substitute themselves for party organs in matters relating to party administration. Once the dispute concerns the interpretation of a party constitution, appointment of committees or internal restructuring without violation of any enforceable statutory right, jurisdiction is ordinarily excluded.

The majority also appears to have overlooked another important consideration. The Federal High Court’s jurisdiction under Section 251 of the Constitution cannot be invoked merely because INEC is joined as a defendant. Jurisdiction depends on the substance of the dispute, not the identity of the parties. If the real complaint is about internal party administration, adding INEC does not convert it into an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.

Finally, the declaration that all congresses and the national convention conducted by the Mark-led leadership are nullities raises significant practical and legal concerns. Nigerian appellate courts have consistently cautioned against invalidating political party processes except where there is clear statutory authority. Such sweeping orders have profound implications for political participation and democratic choice and should not be made in the absence of an express constitutional or statutory violation. Equally, it does not necessarily follow that candidates presented by the ADC stand automatically derecognised by INEC. The Electoral Act prescribes a distinct statutory regime for the nomination and recognition of candidates, and any question affecting the validity of such nominations must be determined within that legal framework rather than by implication from a judgment concerning party executive congresses.

In summary, the minority judgment better reflects established Supreme Court jurisprudence. It preserves the constitutional distinction between internal party autonomy and judicial intervention, respects the limits imposed by the Electoral Act, and recognises that courts are not arbiters of every disagreement arising within political parties. Unless there is a clear breach of an express constitutional or statutory provision, disputes over congresses, leadership structures and committee appointments remain matters for the party’s internal mechanisms rather than the courts.

In the light of the foregoing, the African Democratic Congress (ADC) should immediately exercise its constitutional right of appeal to the Supreme Court for a definitive pronouncement on the issues raised in this case. The dissenting judgment of Justice Abba Mohammed is firmly anchored in the settled jurisprudence of the apex court, whereas the majority decision appears, with respect, to depart from a long line of binding authorities that have consistently insulated the internal administration of political parties from judicial interference except where expressly authorised by the Constitution or the Electoral Act. There are substantial legal grounds upon which the Supreme Court may be invited to review whether the majority correctly applied its earlier decisions. Pending that definitive pronouncement, it would be legally unsound to conclude that the Court of Appeal’s judgment has, without more, extinguished the candidature of persons who emerged from ADC primary elections for the 2027 general elections. A definitive pronouncement from the Supreme Court would restore certainty to Nigeria’s electoral jurisprudence, reaffirm the doctrine of stare decisis, clarify the legal distinction between party executive congresses and candidate nomination primaries, and provide authoritative guidance on the constitutional limits of judicial intervention in the internal affairs of political parties.

Alex Ter Adum, PhD
DDG THE NARRATIVE FORCE.

alexadum45@gmail.com