Nafiu Bala Gombe was not the sole Deputy National Chairman of the legacy African Democratic Congress (ADC). Under Article 16(14) of the party’s Constitution, he was merely one among several Deputy National Chairmen. Crucially, unlike the Deputy National Chairman (Political) who, by virtue of Articles 20(2) and 22(12), stands next in line to succeed the National Chairman, Nafiu Bala occupied the office of Deputy National Chairman (Governance and Legislative Affairs), a position that carries no automatic right of succession.
More fundamentally, he resigned from that position on 18 May 2025. By operation of law, that resignation rendered him functus officio, stripping him of any residual authority or standing to lay claim to the office he now contests. The principle is elementary: one cannot approbate and reprobate. Having relinquished the office, he cannot subsequently assert rights flowing from it. His allegation that the resignation was forged is a matter requiring strict judicial proof; he who asserts must prove.
In addition, the issues he raises are not amenable to determination by originating summons, particularly the allegation of forgery. These are deeply contested questions of fact and law, requiring the evaluation of evidence and the resolution of disputes through pleadings and oral testimony. The procedure he adopted, commencing the suit by originating summons, is therefore fundamentally defective. On that ground alone, the suit is liable to be struck out.
Against this backdrop, the remittal of the matter to the Federal High Court by the Supreme Court for determination on the merits poses no existential threat to the ADC. The mere pendency of litigation is neither novel nor fatal to a political party, particularly where, as here, the case appears both procedurally incompetent and substantively weak.
Even on the merits, the claim collapses under minimal scrutiny. Nafiu Bala was not in the line of succession to the National Chairmanship, and having resigned, he forfeited any arguable entitlement to the office. Furthermore, he actively participated in meetings at which the decisions he now challenges were taken and implemented. He is therefore estopped, under Section 169 of the Evidence Act 2011, from approbating and reprobating.
Moreover, no single individual can constitute the National Working Committee (NWC) of a political party. Documentary evidence in the custody of INEC, as reflected in its court processes, confirms the dissolution of the Raph Nwosu-led NWC by the ADC NEC on 29 July 2025 and the valid appointment of the David Mark-led NWC. His own public statements corroborate these developments. It is therefore misplaced to suggest that this litigation poses any credible threat to the leadership of the ADC or that of David Mark.
Members of the ADC should not be discouraged or disconcerted by the avalanche of alarmist predictions being peddled by opportunistic politico-legal commentators. Much of this commentary appears designed to sow confusion and stall the party’s momentum.
Even if, purely for argument’s sake, the Federal High Court were to deliver an erroneous decision, the judicial process does not terminate there. Appeals lie as of right to the Court of Appeal and ultimately to the Supreme Court, where any such errors can be corrected.
Equally untenable is the claim that any adverse judgment would automatically invalidate all actions taken by the current National Working Committee, including candidate nominations. That position finds no support in law. The law abhors a vacuum and preserves the validity of acts performed under a subsisting authority, in order to protect institutional continuity and third-party interests.
A simple illustration exposes the flaw in that argument: a governor, constitutionally vested with executive powers, including the signing of execution warrants, may have his election subsequently nullified by a court. Are we then to conclude that every official act he performed while in office becomes void? Can a court restore a life extinguished pursuant to a warrant validly issued at the time? The answer is self-evident. The law does not operate in absurdity.
Removal from office, even by judicial pronouncement, does not retrospectively invalidate lawful acts performed while the office was held. To argue otherwise is not only legally unsound but amounts to calculated disinformation intended to mislead and provoke unnecessary panic.
Finally, while public confidence in the judiciary must be preserved, it is important to resist narratives that portray the courts as instruments for validating falsehoods. The judiciary remains bound by law and precedent to uphold truth and legal certainty. Where internal political disputes are frivolous or constitute an abuse of court process, the law, particularly Section 83(5) and (6) of the Electoral Act 2026, provides for sanctions, including costs. These provisions exist to deter speculative and legally unsustainable litigation, and it is expected that they will be given full effect by the Federal High Court.
The stability of democratic institutions depends not on the absence of disputes, but on their disciplined and principled resolution within the bounds of the law.
Alex Ter Adum, PhD
DDG, THE NARRATIVE FORCE
alexadum45@gmail.
