There are lies that survive because they are subtle.
And there are lies that survive because they are shouted.

The lie that Atiku Abubakar “sold Nigeria” belongs to the second category. It is loud, crude, repetitive, and carefully engineered to thrive in a political environment where memory is short, curiosity is discouraged, and outrage is cheaper than evidence.

This lie did not emerge from research. It emerged from fear. Fear of comparison. Fear of memory. Fear of a man whose record refuses to dissolve under scrutiny.

This article exists to end that lie, not with insults, but with history so stubborn, facts so weighty, statistics so unforgiving, and evidence so overwhelming that denial becomes an act of intellectual self-sabotage.

LET US BEGIN WHERE HONEST PEOPLE BEGIN: WITH TIME.

Privatisation did not begin with Atiku Abubakar.It did not begin with democracy.It did not begin with the PDP.

Nigeria’s privatisation programme formally commenced in 1987–1988, under military rule, after decades of statist control had transformed public enterprises into economic sinkholes. By the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, Nigeria’s state-owned enterprises were not merely underperforming; they were structurally bankrupt.

By 1999, when democracy returned, these enterprises:

1. Consumed hundreds of billions of naira annually in subsidies
2. Generated little or no output
3. Were overstaffed by margins exceeding 200–300%
4. Operated with obsolete technology
5. Functioned as patronage centres rather than production hubs

Privatisation did not cause Nigeria’s economic pain.
It was an attempt , late, difficult, and imperfect , to stop the bleeding.

To blame Atiku for privatisation is like blaming a firefighter for the smoke in a house that had been burning for decades.

WHY PRIVATISATION WAS NECESSARY — THE PART THEY NEVER TELL YOU.

Privatisation was not ideological fashion. It was economic necessity.
Nigeria faced three unavoidable realities:

1. The state could no longer fund failing enterprises without crippling the budget
2. Public monopolies had collapsed into corruption and inefficiency
3. Capital, technology, and managerial expertise were absent from government-run enterprises

Continuing state control meant:

1. Fewer schools
2. Fewer hospitals
3. Less infrastructure
4. More debt
5. Deeper poverty

Privatisation was designed to:

1. Reduce fiscal hemorrhage
2. Attract private capital
3. Introduce efficiency and competition
4. Shift government from operator to regulator

This was not radical. It was orthodox economic reform practised globally.

WHAT ATIKU DID NOT DO — AND COULD NOT HAVE DONE.

Atiku Abubakar did not:

1. Personally sell any national asset
2. Personally determine prices
3. Personally select buyers
4. Personally transfer ownership
5. Personally receive shares
6. Personally enrich himself

Privatisation was executed through institutions:

1. The National Council on Privatisation
2. The Bureau of Public Enterprises
3. The Federal Executive Council
4. Independent legal, financial, and technical advisers

The caricature of one man “selling Nigeria” collapses the moment governance is understood.

WHO RAN THE PROCESS — AND WHY THIS MATTERS.

The operational engine of privatisation was the Bureau of Public Enterprises, led at the time by Nasir El-Rufai, who later documented the entire process in The Accidental Public Servant.

According to El-Rufai’s own record:

1. Assets were publicly advertised
2. Bidders submitted technical and financial proposals
3. Due process governed transactions
4. Winners emerged as the most qualified bidders

Today, Atiku Abubakar and Nasir El-Rufai stand politically aligned within the African Democratic Congress coalition.

If privatisation was criminal, why ,after a decade of APC rule , has no government prosecuted either man?

Because propaganda thrives where evidence dies.


THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION — FACTS THAT DESTROY THE MYTH.

Before liberalisation, Nigeria’s telecommunications sector was a national embarrassment.

Before 2001:

1. Fewer than 400,000 functional telephone lines existed nationwide
2. Telephone penetration was below 1% in a country of over 120 million people
3. A telephone line was a status symbol reserved for elites
4. Bribes, long waiting lists, and influence peddling were standard

After liberalisation under the Obasanjo–Atiku administration:

1. GSM licences were issued transparently
2. Competition exploded
3. Millions of Nigerians gained access to telephony within years
4. Nigeria became one of the fastest-growing telecom markets in the world
5. Millions of direct and indirect jobs were created

If privatisation was theft, then GSM was a miracle stolen back from the people.

THE COMPANY-NAME RITUAL — AND THE FACTS THAT SHATTER IT.
Nigeria Airways.

By the early 1990s:

1. Aircraft were grounded
2. Debts were crushing
3. Corruption was endemic
4. Overstaffing was catastrophic

Nigeria Airways was already commercially dead before 1999.

NITEL.
NITEL was obsolete and corrupt.Its decline created space for GSM , one of Nigeria’s greatest economic transformations.

NEPA / PHCN.
Power sector failure began under military monopoly.
Reform attempted rescue; today’s collapse under APC is not Atiku’s inheritance.

Nigerian Refineries.

1. Inactive since 2019.
2. Atiku left office in 2007.
3. Blaming him is arithmetic dishonesty.

Ajaokuta Steel Company.
Military-era contract disputes, abandonment, and sunk costs destroyed it long before democracy returned.

Dunlop Nigeria, Michelin Nigeria
Exited due to power failure and infrastructure collapse ,conditions that worsened under APC.

Leyland Nigeria, Exide Battery Nigeria, ISO Glass Industries
Declined due to global corporate crises, policy inconsistency, and regulatory disputes , not Atiku.

THE ALUMINIUM SMEAR — ALSCON AND THE FINAL COLLAPSE OF THE LIE

No attack on Atiku is complete without invoking Aluminium Smelter Company of Nigeria (ALSCON).

Before privatisation:

1. Billions of dollars had been sunk
2. Production was erratic or non-existent
3. Power supply was unstable
4. Losses mounted annually

ALSCON was not a thriving jewel. It was a comatose industrial patient.

Privatisation sought:

1. Capital injection
2. Technical expertise
3. Operational revival
4. Relief from fiscal drain

Atiku did not own ALSCON.
Atiku did not secretly sell ALSCON.Atiku did not profit from ALSCON.

Subsequent litigation and arbitration produced no indictment, no asset trace, no finding of personal enrichment.

If ALSCON failed because of Atiku, why did APC governments fail to revive it years later?

THE STATISTICS THEY FEAR MOST.

Privatisation under the Obasanjo–Atiku era recorded approximately 63% success, strong by global post-authoritarian standards.

Under APC:

1. Inflation soared
2. Debt ballooned
3. Purchasing power collapsed
4. Refineries shut down
5. Insecurity spread

Yet Atiku remains the target — because memory is dangerous.

THE IRONY THAT EXPOSES EVERYTHING.

APC continues privatisation today:

1. Refinery concessioning
2. Power restructuring
3. Rail concessions

They denounce Atiku for doing openly what they now practise quietly.
That is not ideology. That is panic.

Privatisation under Atiku Abubakar was:

1. Institutional, not personal
2. Necessary, not malicious
3. Documented, not hidden
4. Reform-driven, not predatory

His alliance with Nasir El-Rufai within the ADC is not coincidence. It is the return of reform memory against manufactured ignorance.

History has spoken.
Facts have testified.
Statistics have crushed propaganda.

What remains is noise.
And noise always collapses under truth.

Aare Amerijoye DOT.B
Director-General
The Narrative Force