INTRODUCTION
I listened to the INEC Chairman, Prof. Joash Amupitan, SAN’s interview on Arise TV this morning, wherein he submitted that by the refusal of INEC not to attend and observe the ADC scheduled congresses and convention, the party and it’s potential candidates in the 2027 general election risk disqualification, if the ADC proceeds with it’s programme of activities. Alarmed by that narrative, I have painstakingly reviewed the law and with the utmost due respect to the Chairman, a Professor of law and Learned Senior Advocate of Nigeria, I beg to categorically and unequivocally disagree.
In a democracy governed by law, institutions derive their authority not from convenience or discretion, but from statute. That is why the unfolding controversy between the African Democratic Congress (ADC) and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is deeply unsettling. It reveals a creeping and dangerous tendency for a regulator to assume powers the law has neither granted nor contemplated.
At the heart of the dispute lies a simple legal question: Does INEC’s failure to attend a party’s congress or convention invalidate the outcome of that exercise?
WHAT THE LAW SAYS
The Electoral Act, 2022(As Amended) answers this question in the negative with clarity. Unfortunately, Amupitan’s statement and INEC’s conduct suggests otherwise.
Section 82(1) of the Electoral Act imposes a mandatory obligation on political parties to give INEC at least 21 days’ notice of any congress or convention convened to elect party executives or nominate candidates. This requirement is strict and non-negotiable. It is the price parties must pay for transparency and regulatory oversight.
But the same provision draws a deliberate line. Under Section 82(2), INEC may attend and observe such proceedings. The choice of the word “may” is not accidental, it is a clear signal that attendance is discretionary, not compulsory. The law gives INEC an opportunity, not a veto power.
Even more decisive is Section 82(5), which provides the only statutory consequence for non-compliance: failure to give notice renders the exercise invalid. The Act is conspicuously silent on any consequence flowing from INEC’s absence. That silence is not a gap, it is a legislative choice.
Yet, in the ADC matter, the INEC Chairman appears to be advancing a troubling proposition: that its non-attendance can somehow undermine or delegitimize a congress conducted after full compliance with the notice requirement. That position is not only wrong, it is dubiously dangerous.
The courts have long settled this issue. In Amaechi v. INEC (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt.1080) 227, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that political parties are the primary actors in their internal affairs, while INEC plays only a supervisory role. It is not a participant, and certainly not a validator.
Similarly, in CPC v. Ombugadu (2013) 18 NWLR (Pt.1385), the Court of Appeal made it clear that what is fatal is the failure to give statutory notice. Once notice is given, the legal threshold is crossed. INEC’s subsequent actions or inactions, cannot retroactively defeat compliance.
In Labour Party v. Wike (2015) LPELR-25991 (CA), the court described the 21-day notice requirement as “mandatory and fundamental.” The emphasis, again, was on the party’s obligation, not INEC’s attendance.
This position was recently reinforced in the litigation arising from the APC senatorial primaries involving the Senate President, Godswill Akpabio in 2022.
In that case, the Federal High Court held that:
INEC’s failure to monitor or attend a validly conducted primary cannot be used to invalidate the process, and the consequences of such failure cannot be visited on the party or its candidates.
The court went further to emphasize that INEC lacks the vires to reject or invalidate a primary conducted in compliance with the law merely because it did not observe it.
This reasoning is both compelling and directly applicable to the present ADC situation.
What then is INEC’s role? As clarified in Akinyele v. Adewale (2015) LPELR-25718 (CA), the purpose of notice is to afford INEC the opportunity to observe. It is an invitation, not a condition precedent. If INEC declines that invitation, it cannot later complain that the event took place without it.
To allow such reasoning would produce an absurdity: a statutory body could, by simply staying away, invalidate a lawful process. That would be an extraordinary and unlawful expansion of regulatory power.
The implications go beyond the ADC. If this position is allowed to stand, it would mean that the internal democracy of political parties is no longer governed by law, but by the whims of administrative attendance. Congresses and conventions would hang not on compliance with statute, but on whether INEC officials choose to show up. That is not regulation, it is control.
There is also a deeper constitutional concern. By attempting to elevate its discretionary role into a determinative one, INEC risks encroaching on the autonomy of political parties, a principle the courts have consistently protected. The law does not permit a regulator to become an arbiter of internal party legitimacy simply by manipulating its own presence or absence.
The doctrine of statutory interpretation reinforces this point. Where the legislature has expressly provided that failure to give notice leads to invalidity, it has, by necessary implication, excluded every other ground. This principle, affirmed in cases such as Attorney-General of the Federation v. Abubakar (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt.1041) 1 & Skye Bank v. Iwu (2017) 16 NWLR (Pt.1590) 24 , forbids the importation of extraneous conditions into clear statutory language.
INEC must therefore resist the temptation to stretch its powers beyond legal limits. The rule of law demands fidelity to the statute, not creative reinterpretation.
The ADC dispute is, in many ways, a test case. It will determine whether Nigeria’s electoral regulator remains a neutral umpire or drifts into becoming an active participant in political outcomes. The line is thin, but it is unmistakable.
Compliance with Section 82 is the legal threshold. Once crossed, the validity of a congress or convention does not depend on INEC’s attendance. To suggest otherwise is to rewrite the law, and that is a power INEC simply does not have.
In the end, the issue is not about ADC. It is about preserving the integrity of the legal framework that underpins Nigeria’s democracy. If that framework can be bent by administrative convenience, then the danger is not just immediate, it is systemic.
And that is a risk the law was designed to prevent.
CONCLUSION
This Is Time to Assert the Law, Not Yield to It.
The ADC now stands at a critical crossroads, not merely of political strategy, but of legal principle. Having complied with the clear and mandatory requirements of Section 82 of the Electoral Act, 2022 (as amended) by issuing the requisite 21-day notice, the party is on firm legal ground to proceed with its scheduled congresses and convention.
To do otherwise would be to concede a power to INEC that the law does not grant.
The proper course is therefore twofold.
First, the ADC should proceed confidently with its internal democratic processes, secure in the knowledge that INEC’s attendance is not a condition precedent to validity. The law requires notice, not permission to conduct its internal affairs.
Secondly, and more importantly, the ADC should seek immediate judicial intervention to protect the integrity of its processes and the limits of regulatory authority. The courts should be invited to:
- Compel INEC to attend and observe, if it desires to attend in accordance with its statutory role under Section 82; or
- In the alternative, restrain INEC from further interference or disturbing the internal affairs of the party, if it elects not to attend and observe, particularly any conduct that suggests a partisan posture or an attempt to undermine the lawful internal affairs of the party.
This is not merely about participation; it is about preserving the neutrality of the electoral umpire. INEC must be reminded, firmly but legally, that it is an impartial regulator, not a political actor, and that its powers are bounded by statute, not expanded by discretion.
If the ADC retreats in the face of this pressure, it risks normalizing a precedent where compliance with the law is no longer sufficient. But if it stands its ground, legally and decisively, it will not only vindicate its own position, but reinforce a principle essential to the sustenance of Nigeria’s democracy: that the rule of law prevails over administrative overreach.
The moment therefore calls not for hesitation, but for lawful assertion. And the ADC must assert
